Launch facts and concise buyer answers

A decision-oriented resource guide on quantum risk, trust architecture, and post-quantum readiness for boards, CISOs, architects, and investors.

Quantum risk is a lead-time problem. The hard part is migration, inventory, and governance, not just predicting a breakthrough date.

It uses an evidence hierarchy grounded in official guidance, standards, procurement language, and production platform behavior rather than broad futurist claims.

The Quantum Almanac 2026-2027 went on sale on Amazon on March 4, 2026 (hardcover; Kindle March 5) and launched publicly on March 10, 2026.

The book is available in a $99.99 glossy hardcover edition and as a Kindle edition on Amazon.

20 chapters organized across threat modeling, operational guidance, sector playbooks, and governance, plus 11 appendices including a board briefing kit, procurement workbook, case studies, and glossary.

Lt. Gen. Mark E. Weatherington, USAF (Ret.), Chairman of the Defense Innovation Council at Qtonic Quantum Corp, former Deputy Commander of Air Force Global Strike Command, and former Commander of the Eighth Air Force.

No. The public site is limited to approved launch assets, short quotes, metadata, and commercial book information.

Harvest now, decrypt later (HNDL) is an attack strategy where adversaries intercept and store encrypted data today, intending to decrypt it once a cryptographically relevant quantum computer becomes available. Chapter 3 builds this threat model from first principles.

Now. The NIST PQC standards were finalized in August 2024, and NIST IR 8547 proposes deprecating quantum-vulnerable algorithms after 2030 and disallowing them after 2035. The Almanac works backward from its own readiness control date of January 1, 2029. The migration timeline, not the threat timeline, is the binding constraint. Chapter 20 provides a concrete 12-month action plan.

ML-KEM (Module-Lattice Key Encapsulation Mechanism, formerly CRYSTALS-Kyber) is the NIST-standardized post-quantum algorithm for key exchange. It replaces classical key exchange in TLS and other protocols. Apple, Google, and Cloudflare are already deploying it in production.

Yes, but briefly. The book distinguishes QKD from post-quantum cryptography. QKD uses quantum physics to distribute keys and requires specialized hardware. PQC uses classical computers with quantum-resistant algorithms. The book focuses on PQC because it is the actionable migration path for most organizations.

Yes, specifically to public-key cryptography (RSA, ECC, Diffie-Hellman). Symmetric encryption (AES) needs larger key sizes and hash functions (SHA-3) larger output sizes under Grover’s algorithm, but neither is fundamentally broken. The book maps exactly what breaks, what does not, and what changes first.

Financial services, healthcare, government, and critical infrastructure face the highest exposure due to long data retention requirements, regulatory obligations, and complex PKI dependencies. Chapters 14 through 17 provide sector-specific playbooks.

Chapter 18 covers governance, capital allocation, and board communication. Appendix B provides a ready-to-use board briefing kit, 90-day checklist, and operating cadence template.

There is no single statutory migration date. OMB Memorandum M-23-02 requires federal agencies to inventory quantum-vulnerable cryptography every year through 2035, and NIST IR 8547 proposes deprecating quantum-vulnerable algorithms after 2030 and disallowing them after 2035. The Almanac uses January 1, 2029 as its readiness control date: the point by which inventory, plan, and procurement should be in place to meet those windows. Private sector organizations face indirect pressure through federal procurement requirements and supply chain expectations.